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Corruption, Trade Costs, and Gains from Tariff 
Liberalization: Evidence from Southern Africa†
By Sandra Sequeira*
This paper exploits  quasi-experimental variation in tariffs in south-
ern Africa to estimate trade elasticities. Traded quantities respond 
only weakly to a 30 percent reduction in the average nominal tariff 
rate. Trade flow data combined with primary data on firm behavior 
and bribe payments suggest that corruption is a potential explanation 
for the observed low elasticities. In contexts of pervasive corruption, 
even small bribes can significantly reduce tariffs, making tariff liber-
alization schemes less likely to affect the extensive and the intensive 
margins of firms’ import behavior. The tariff liberalization scheme 
is, however, still associated with improved incentives to accurately 
report quantities of imported goods, and with a significant reduction 
in bribe transfers from importers to public officials. (JEL D22, D73, 
F13, H83, O17, O19, O24)
Trade elasticities play a central role in standard models of trade by determining 
the effects of policy interventions and the calculation of gains from trade (Hillberry 
and Hummels 2013; Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare 2012). Yet in prac-
tice, we still lack reliable estimates of this elasticity. Approaches that rely mostly 
on  time-series variation in trade costs tend to estimate elasticities in the range of 
one or smaller, while  cross-sectional analyses estimate elasticities of five or higher 
(Baier and Bergstrand 2001; Broda and Weinstein 2006; Romalis 2007; Hillberry 
and Hummels 2013; Caliendo and Parro 2015). The standard explanations for this 
discrepancy range from attenuation bias due to measurement challenges and the 
endogeneity of trade costs (Trefler 1993), to the fact that the two approaches exploit 
different sources of variation: the  time-series work exploits  short-run adjustments 
to changes in trade costs, while the  cross-sectional studies reflect more  long-run 
effects of differential levels of trade costs across industries or countries (Goldberg 
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and Pavcnik 2016). Moreover, trade elasticities are seldom estimated from actual 
trade policy changes that affect trade costs (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2016). This paper 
attempts to fill this gap. I first exploit  quasi-experimental variation in import tariff 
costs associated with a  long-standing trade agreement in southern Africa to estimate 
trade elasticities. I then collect a novel dataset on bribe payments to provide sugges-
tive evidence on how corruption in the import process can potentially affect tariff 
costs and help interpret the observed elasticities.
The main source of exogenous variation in trade costs exploited in this study 
results from a trade agreement between South Africa and Mozambique (under 
the Southern African Development Community Agreement), which dictated the 
pace and scope of tariff reductions occurring between 2001 and 2015. This Trade 
Protocol was signed in 1996, in the aftermath of major political and economic 
upheaval in South Africa, and as Mozambique exited a protracted civil war. More 
recently, both countries have rebuilt their economies and a different set of eco-
nomic interests have come to the fore.1 Despite these changes, the scheduled tariff 
reductions were strictly followed, with the largest reduction in the average nom-
inal tariff rate (of 5 percentage points) occurring in 2008. It is thus plausible to 
assume that the sequence and the magnitude of the tariff changes were not driven 
by specific industries or lobbies operating in either country today. Note that this 
trade agreement also significantly reduced trade policy uncertainty, and should, as 
a result, lead to sizable changes in traded quantities (Handley and Limao 2015; 
Handley 2014). The analysis covers the time period between 2006 and 2014 to 
ensure enough time for firms to adjust their import behavior in response to the 
tariff change.
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps and yields the following find-
ings. First, to estimate  reduced-form trade elasticities, I match data on tariffs from 
the Mozambican Customs Authority to aggregate trade flow data from the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) for trade between 
South Africa and Mozambique, during the period  2006–2014.2 I find that trade 
elasticities are close to the lower range of elasticities identified in the literature for 
 time-series analysis (0.1). I conduct several robustness checks to test for strict exog-
eneity and to account for measurement error.
Second, I examine the  micro-foundations of these elasticities by directly observ-
ing  firm-level import behavior in the region, before and after the main tariff change 
in 2008. I collect data for a panel of 190 firms operating in the trade corridor linking 
South Africa to Mozambique, eliciting information on import behavior and general 
 firm-level characteristics. This survey suggested that the tariff changes were infram-
arginal: incumbent firms did not adjust the extensive or intensive margins of import 
behavior in response to changes in nominal tariff costs.
Third, I conduct a detailed analysis of corruption patterns by measuring bribe 
payments along the trade corridor linking South Africa to Mozambique, between 
2007 and 2013, for a random sample of over 1,000 shipments imported into 
1 The South African economy has diversified from mining into the manufacturing sector and the Mozambican 
economy is now specializing in industries associated with the recent natural resource boom. 
2 No data are available for earlier years. 
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Mozambique.3 The first finding is that prior to the tariff change, bribe payments 
were high and mostly directed at tariff evasion. Approximately 80 percent of the 
random sample of shipments tracked were associated with a bribe payment during 
the clearing process. While bribes were sizable in absolute terms (mean bribes were 
US$128 per tonnage),4 they were small relative to the magnitude of the tariff eva-
sion rent. Consistent with a  long-standing puzzle in the literature, the Tullock par-
adox, bribes represented only about 7 percent of the total tariff duties saved by the 
average importer.
The exogenous change in tariffs induced by the trade agreement provided an 
opportunity to examine the impact of changes in tariffs on corruption patterns, 
through a  difference-in-differences design. Several products did not experience a 
change in tariff rates during this period and as such, constitute a credible control 
group for those that did. This heterogeneity in exposure to the tariff changes allows 
me to isolate a causal relationship between tariffs and corruption. The removal of tar-
iffs significantly reduced the probability of bribe payments (by 30 percent) and the 
average amount of bribes paid (by 20 percent). These results are robust to the stan-
dard tests for the validity of a  difference-in-differences approach and to a detailed 
analysis of potential displacement effects of corruption onto other products or other 
stages of the delivery of the public service. Consistent with the corruption hypothe-
sis, I also observe that the removal of tariffs reduced the incentive for Mozambican 
importers to misrepresent the quantity of imports, and that these figures converge to 
those reported by the South African exporters once tariffs are removed.
Artificially low estimates of trade elasticities then pose a challenge to estimat-
ing welfare gains from tariff reductions. Following the Arkolakis, Costinot, and 
Rodriguez-Clare (2012) formula, the gains from the tariff reduction are implausibly 
high at 87 percent. This is an artifact of the excessively low estimated trade elastici-
ties and as such, do not represent actual gains from the change in tariffs.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the impact of a reduction in tariffs on 
trade flows depends on whether tariffs represent a significant cost to firms in the 
first place. This paper presents new evidence on how in environments with perva-
sive corruption, substantial tariff liberalization can potentially translate into small 
changes in trade costs, and consequently, low estimates of trade elasticities and 
incorrect measures of the gains associated with tariff liberalization. Tariff liberaliza-
tion schemes can, however, still be associated with the reduction of bribe transfers 
from private agents to public officials and with improved incentives for the accurate 
reporting of trade flows.
These findings contribute to several strands in the literature on trade and develop-
ment. First, they directly address knowledge gaps identified in the trade survey liter-
ature (Hillberry and Hummels 2013; Goldberg and Pavcnik 2016). They contribute 
to an extensive literature attempting to estimate and interpret trade elasticities (Baier 
and Bergstrand 2001; Broda and Weinstein 2006; Romalis 2007; Caliendo and Parro 
2015) and to measure the effect of tariff changes on imported volumes (Amiti and 
3 The trade corridor connecting Mozambique to South Africa consists of a land border located 60 miles from 
the Mozambican capital and 250 miles from the South African capital, and a main port in Maputo, Mozambique, 
which is linked by cabotage shipping to the main port of Durban, in South Africa, at a distance of 288 nautical miles. 
4 Equivalent to 129 percent of port usage fees and 14 percent of the overall cost of importing a standard 20-foot 
container from the Far East into Mozambique. 
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Konings 2007; Goldberg et al. 2010). The findings also add to a related literature 
aimed at calculating gains from trade (Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare 
2012) and helps contextualize discussions on the effect of trade policies on trade 
growth (Deardorff and Stern 1986; Frankel and Romer 1999; Harrison and Hanson 
1999; Baier and Bergstrand 2001; Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001; Anderson and 
Wincoop 2003; Rose 2004). 
Second, this paper provides a methodological contribution to a growing body of 
empirical work attempting to measure corruption and trade costs. While the com-
mon approach in the literature is to rely on an indirect measure of tariff evasion—the 
trade gap—the approach followed in this paper allows for more direct and precise 
measures of the overall level, distribution, and type of corruption associated with the 
movement of goods across borders, while accounting for any potential displacement 
effects associated with trade policy changes.
Third, the corruption analysis also contributes to an extensive theoretical and 
empirical debate examining the relationship between tariff rates and tariff evasion. 
The literature is divided on whether higher tariff rates increase incentives for tariff 
evasion to occur (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Clotfelter 1983; Panagaryia 1996; 
Poterba 1987; Gatti 1999; Fisman and Wei 2004; Mishra, Subramanian, and Topalova 
2008; Sequeira and Djankov 2014) or if lower tariffs increase private agents’ abil-
ity to pay higher bribes through an income effect (Feinstein 1991; Slemrod and 
Yitzhaki 2002). The findings in this paper lend support to the hypothesis that higher 
tariffs are associated with higher tariff evasion, with limited income effects. 
Finally, these findings relate to a growing literature in law and economics that 
measures the potential for policy reform to trigger the displacement of corrup-
tion across different types of illicit activities (Reppetto 1976; Chaiken, Lawless, 
and Stevenson 1974; McPheters, Mann, and Schlagenhauf 1984; Ayres and Levitt 
1998; Levitt 1998; Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004). With the exception of Yang 
(2008a, b), displacement effects of corruption in the context of trade policy and 
trade costs have remained largely unexplored. Because I observe the entire chain of 
public service delivery in a critical public bureaucracy for a long enough time hori-
zon of five years, I am able to provide new evidence on how the demand and supply 
side of bribes adjust to policy reforms that change opportunities for certain, but not 
all, corrupt transactions to take place. It also allows me to test a central prediction in 
Yang (2008a): that displacement is low when the fixed and variable costs of alterna-
tive methods of bribe extraction are high.
The paper is organized as follows: Section I describes the tariff liberalization 
scheme that generated the variation in tariff prices used in the empirical analysis; 
Section II discusses the estimation of trade elasticities based on the tariff liberaliza-
tion schedule, using aggregate trade flow data and  firm-level data; Section III exam-
ines the role of corruption in determining actual tariff prices through a combination 
of indirect and direct measures of bribes; Section IV discusses several robustness 
checks; and Section V concludes.
I. The SADC Tariff Liberalization Scheme
Mozambique joined the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 
1992, committing to the SADC Trade Protocol in 1996, which required the  complete 
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 phaseout of tariff rates for South African imports by 2015. The agreed timeline for 
the reduction in tariff rates in Mozambique was similar to the reforms adopted by 
other SADC member countries such as Malawi, Tanzania, Angola, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe, and the goal was to harmonize regional tariff regimes. In terms of the 
magnitude of tariff changes, the most significant reduction took place in 2007–2008, 
reducing the average nominal tariff rate by approximately 5 percentage points (cor-
responding to a 30 percent decline in the average tariff rate). In all cases, treated 
products went from a positive tariff rate to zero tariffs.5
Since the schedule for the tariff  phaseout was set in the  mid-1990s, it is unlikely 
to have been driven by import patterns in the region today, thus mitigating the possi-
bility of reverse causality. There were no deviations from the agreed tariff  phaseout 
schedule, suggesting that there was no strategic behavior to sustain longstanding 
patterns of trade protection. Moreover, the tariff schedule is unlikely to reflect 
entrenched private sector interests today given the dramatic change in the compo-
sition of the private sector in Mozambique between the end of the civil war in the 
early 90s and the inflow of investment associated with the recent resource boom, and 
in South Africa since the fall of Apartheid.
Table 1 presents further evidence of the comparability of trade patterns and  product 
characteristics between products experiencing a reduction in tariffs and products 
that remained in the same tariff grouping throughout the period under analysis. 
Trade patterns are measured in terms of the share of value and quantities imported 
by each product grouping (treatment versus control) from South Africa prior to the 
tariff change, as well as their unit value. Product characteristics include the value per 
tonnage of the shipments, the number of containers shipped per  product  category, 
5 Prior to that, the Mozambican Tariff Scheme followed a standard bimodal structure with higher protection on 
agricultural products, followed by manufacturing and mining. The highest tariff rate in 2007 was 20 percent. 
Table 1—Comparability of Trade Patterns and Product Characteristics across Treatment and 
Control Products, Prior to the 2008 Tariff Change
Treatment Comparison
Difference
t-test/χ2
p-value
products products
Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A. Patterns of trade (N = 4,660)
Share of imports (quantities) 38.1 492.5 241.2 5244.4 0.20
Share of imports (value) 22.2 237.2 33.84 341.2 0.19
Unit value 4.82 53.7 6.21 83.3 0.51
Panel B. Product characteristics (N = 265)
Shipment value per ton (USD) 44,027 179,869 410,508 2,959,621 0.25
Number of containers per shipment 7.99 2.606 7.4 3.173 0.10
Bulk cargo (non-containerized) 0.94
Rauch product classification 0.01
Notes: In panel A, the share of imports corresponds to the share of imports into Mozambique from South Africa 
relative to imports from the Rest of the World. Treatment products are all products affected by the tariff change and 
comparison products are all products that did not experience a change in tariffs. p-values are for t-tests of equal-
ity of means of continuous variables, assuming unequal variances. In panel B, the data correspond to the sample of 
shipments captured in the audit study conducted by the author in 2007.
Sources: United Nations COMTRADE database, Mozambican customs tariff code, and audit study conducted by 
the author
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and whether cargo was containerized or shipped in bulk given that containerized 
cargo is potentially easier to misreport. The table also includes a test of whether a 
product has an internationally set reference price given evidence in the literature 
suggesting that this is an important determinant of tariff evasion (see Section IIIB 
for a discussion of this hypothesis). Products that experienced a tariff change in 
2008 are similar in all dimensions to products that did not change tariff in 2008.6
II. Tariff Liberalization and Import Behavior
A. Tariffs and Import Volumes: Aggregate Trade Flow Data
Trade elasticities are of central importance in the quantitative analysis of the 
impact of tariffs on trade. There is, however, considerable disagreement over the 
magnitudes of trade elasticities in the literature. Caliendo and Parro (2015) esti-
mate sectoral elasticities that range between 0.37 (s.e. 1.08) and 51.8 (s.e. 18.05); 
Hummels (2001) estimates elasticities ranging between 5.3 and 7.3; Broda and 
Weinstein (2006) present median elasticities of 3.7 with significant skewness in 
sectoral averages; Romalis (2007) estimates average elasticities ranging between 
6.2 (s.e. 0.80) and 10.9 (s.e. 1.16) and Simonovska and Waugh (2014) estimate an 
average elasticity of 4.14 (s.e. 0.09). Studies relying on  time-series variation in trade 
costs tend to estimate elasticities closer to 1 or lower (Bergstrand 1989; Greenhalgh, 
Taylor, and Wilson 1994; Shiells and Reinert 1993; Hillberry and Hummels 2013; 
Goldberg and Pavcnik 2016). These discrepancies are often justified in the literature 
as the result of attenuation bias due to measurement error and to the endogeneity 
of trade costs (Trefler 1993). Moreover, studies that exploit  time-series variation in 
trade costs are often seen as capturing  short-run adjustments to trade costs, which 
could also explain the smaller elasticities.
In this section, I use secondary data on aggregate import flows to examine the 
impact of changes in tariff rates on Mozambican imports from South Africa during 
the period for which data are available from the United Nations Statistical Division’s 
(UNSD) Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE):  2006–2014. 
Commodities are defined using the Harmonized Commodity Description and 
Coding System (HS) at the  six-digit level of aggregation. Tariff rates are obtained 
directly from the Customs Authority in Mozambique (Alfandegas de Mocambique). 
I estimate  foreign-foreign substitutions resulting from  quasi-experimental changes 
in tariffs for imports from South Africa into Mozambique, as a share of imports into 
Mozambique from the Rest of the World. To do so, I rely on data reported by export-
ers as these have, in theory, a reduced incentive to misreport the volume or the value 
of traded goods (Bhagwati 1964). The main specification corresponds to
(1)  log Im port Shar e it =  α 0 +  α 1 log Tariff Rat e it +  μ t +  γ i +  ϵ it ,
where  log Im portShare  it represents the total volume of imports of product  i from 
South Africa in period  t , as a share of total imports from the Rest of the World, 
6 The only exception is whether a product has an internationally set price and as such, this will be an important 
variable to control for in the analysis. 
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in logarithmic form.  log Tariff Rat e it corresponds to the tariff rate of product  i in 
period  t , also in logarithmic form.  μ t and  γ i represent year and  product-level fixed 
effects defined at the  four-digit level of the harmonized system (HS) classification. 
These fixed effects control for  nontariff barriers, unobservable trade costs, as well as 
other  year-specific impacts on macroeconomic conditions that can condition firms’ 
import behavior.  α 1 represents the coefficient of interest measuring the elasticity of 
imports to changes in tariff rates.7
Trade elasticities reported in column 1 of Table 2 are close to 0.02 but insig-
nificant. Given the extended period under analysis and uncertain priors as to how 
quickly one would expect the effects of the tariff change to be reflected in aggregate 
import behavior, column 2 presents estimates from a model in  first-differences that 
compares outcomes just prior to, and just after, the change in tariffs, while column 3 
presents estimates for a model in  long-differences, which compares results well 
before and well after the policy change took place. These different specifications 
test the robustness of the results and mitigate outstanding concerns with unobserved, 
 time-variant product or market heterogeneity. The  long-differences model further 
mitigates the problem of serial correlation.
7 This specification follows from Caliendo and Parro (2015) since trade elasticities are retrieved from import 
and tariff data only, under the assumption that the error term  ϵ it is uncorrelated with the tariff changes across time. 
Table 2—Tariff Liberalization and Import Volumes, 2006–2014:  
Aggregate Import Flows
log share import volumes
Fixed First Long Instrumental
effects differences differences variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. 2 SLS Estimate
log tariff rate −0.016 −0.097
(0.027) (0.050)
 Δ log tariff rate −0.010 −0.076
(0.019) (0.018)
Panel B. First stage dep. var. log tariff rate
Lagged log tariff rate (one period) 0.841
(0.042)
Lagged log tariff rate (two periods) −0.085
(0.011)
Baseline tariff rate 2006 −0.040
(0.002)
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 207.09
Observations 21,520 16,353 13,022 15,326
Mean of dependent variable  1.094  1.051  1.055  1.130
Notes: log share import volumes corresponds to the quantity of imports from South African as 
a share of the total quantity of imports from the rest of the world into Mozambique, in loga-
rithmic form. Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the product’s four-digit HS code.
Sources: United Nations COMTRADE database and Mozambican customs tariff code. 
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Estimates for the fixed effects specification and for the model in  first-differences 
are very similar suggesting that strict exogeneity is not violated. All estimates con-
firm that a reduction in tariff rates is associated with an increase in import volumes 
and values, though the coefficients are small (lower than 0.1).
A possible concern with these results is that models of fixed effects and first or 
 long-differences exacerbate attenuation bias due to measurement error in the inde-
pendent variable of interest. To mitigate this concern, column 4 presents results 
based on an instrumental variable approach, instrumenting tariff rates with the 
lagged tariff rate and the baseline tariff in 2006 (Griliches and Hausman 1986). The 
first stage is strong and the Kleibergen Paap F-statistic is well above the conven-
tional threshold of ten. This preferred specification reveals slightly larger elasticities 
than the previous specifications but still close to the lower range of the estimates 
obtained in the literature (0.1). This is surprising given the permanent nature of the 
tariff shock, the fact that the tariff removal was  well-known in advance to firms and 
the long time horizon of the analysis for which substitution possibilities would, in 
theory, be higher. 
To examine the possibility that firms responded to the tariff change by upgrading 
the quality of their imports as opposed to expanding the quantity imported, Table 3 
shows the impact of the tariff change on the unit value of imports from South Africa 
into Mozambique, normalized by the unit value of imports into Mozambique from 
the Rest of the World. Most coefficients are again small, including the estimates 
Table 3—Tariff Liberalization and Unit Value of Imports, 2006–2014:  
Aggregate Import Flows
log share unit value
Fixed First Long Instrumental
effects differences differences variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. 2 SLS Estimate
log tariff rate 0.001 0.002
(0.011) (0.013)
 Δ log tariff rate −0.008 0.080
(0.012) (0.011)
Panel B. First stage dep. var. log tariff rate
Lagged log tariff rate (one period) 0.841
(0.042)
Lagged log tariff rate (two periods) −0.085
(0.011)
Baseline tariff rate 2006 −0.040
(0.002)
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 207.09
Observations 21,520 16,353 12,977 15,326
Mean of dependent variable  0.706  0.673  0.664  0.667
Notes: log share import volumes corresponds to the unit value of South African imports as a 
share of the unit value of imports from the rest of the world into Mozambique, in logarithmic 
form. Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the product’s four-digit HS code.
Sources: United Nations COMTRADE database and Mozambican customs tariff code 
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resulting from the preferred instrumental variable specification. This suggests that 
firms did not respond to the tariff change by upgrading quality.
Trade elasticities are a central parameter in the calculation of the impact of trade 
policy on welfare. To estimate the change in real income associated with the tar-
iff liberalization policy, I follow the formula derived in Arkolakis, Costinot, and 
Rodriguez-Clare (2012):  W ̂ =   λ ′  _λ
 1 _ϵ , which relies on two sufficient statistics to 
estimate welfare gains associated with trade shocks:  λ representing the share of 
expenditures on domestic goods and  ϵ representing a measure of the elasticity of 
imports with respect to variable tariff costs. Changes in import penetration rates 
between 2007 (34 percent) and 2014 (38 percent as the median import penetration 
rate between 2008 and 2014) and an estimated elasticity of −0.1 (identified above), 
suggest an estimated 87 percent gain in real income associated with the tariff reduc-
tion.8 This figure is implausibly high, and is an artifact of extremely small estimated 
trade elasticities.
B. Tariffs and Import Volumes:  Firm-Level Data
To examine the  micro-foundations of the trade elasticities estimated in the pre-
vious section, I observe the import behavior of firms affected by the tariff change 
through a  two-wave survey of 190 formal Mozambican firms, in 2006 and 2010, 
before and after the main tariff change took place in 2007–2008. The sample was 
drawn from firms established in the direct hinterland of the trade corridor linking 
South Africa to Mozambique. The survey elicited the percentage of the main input 
each firm imported, information on the tariff grouping the input belonged to and 
several  firm-level characteristics such as firm size, industry grouping, and the gen-
der and ethnicity of the manager of the firm.9
Tariffs can potentially affect both the extensive and intensive margins of import 
behavior by limiting a firm’s entry into international markets, but also by restrict-
ing the average volume imported by each firm. I begin by looking at the impact of 
tariff changes on the extensive margin of import behavior through the following 
specification:
(2)  D.Im port Statu s k =  α 0 +  α 1 D.Tarif  f k +  α 3  X k +  ω i +  ϵ k ,
where  D.Im port Statu s k captures whether a firm stopped importing, continued to 
source domestically, or began importing its main input between 2006 and 2010, 
and  D.Tarif  f k captures the change in the tariff level experienced by firm  k ’s main 
input.  X k is a vector of  firm-level characteristics such as the size of the firm, its 
8 This corresponds to  W ̂ =  0.62 _0.66
 1 ____ −0.1 . Data on import penetration rates are obtained from the World Bank 
Indicators for Mozambique and verified against input-output tables produced by the National Institute of Statistics 
in Mozambique. 
9 A clear limitation is that I lack an indicator of total expenditures on imported inputs or the number of total 
inputs imported. While this is a concern, the existing literature suggests that firms’ import spending tends to be 
concentrated in a few core products (Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl 2015), thus partially mitigating concerns with 
measurement error. 
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length of establishment, ownership structure (foreign or domestic), as well as sev-
eral  owner-level characteristics such as ethnicity, given previous evidence in the lit-
erature of the importance of  ethnic-based trade networks (Rauch 2001).  ω i denotes 
industry fixed effects that account for any structural,  time-invariant heterogeneity 
across industries.
To investigate the impact of changes in tariffs on the intensive margin of import 
behavior, I rely on the following specification:
(3)  D. Pctg Im ported Inpu t k =  α 0 +  α 1 D. Tarif  f k +  α 3  X k +  ω i +  ϵ k ,
where  D. Pctg Im ported Inpu t k represents the change in the percentage of firm  k ’s 
inputs that are imported between 2006 and 2010. The remainder of the specification 
is identical to equation (3). 
The results in Table 4 are consistent with the elasticities estimated in Section IIA. 
Despite the sizable tariff change that occurred in 2007–2008, firms importing the 
inputs affected by the tariff reductions did not appear to significantly adjust either 
the extensive or intensive margins of import behavior, at least in the  short run.
An important caveat in this analysis, and one that does not apply to the results 
in the previous section, is that it is restricted to incumbent firms. The lack of an 
adequate industrial census in Mozambique prevents an analysis of patterns of entry 
Table 4—Tariff Liberalization and Import Volumes, 2006–2010: Firm-Level Data
Extensive margin Intensive margin
change in change in
import status pctg of imp. input
Ordered probit Ordinary least squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Δ log tariff rate −0.113 −0.106 −0.091 −0.738 0.689 1.681
(0.079) (0.136) (0.160) (2.306) (3.927) (4.936)
Firm size 0.539 0.534 10.127 9.355
(0.229) (0.238) (7.212) (7.154)
Ethnicity of owner 0.188 0.187 7.388 5.681
(0.187) (0.178) (7.430) (6.839)
Foreign firm 0.456 0.436 15.155 14.250
(0.329) (0.269) (14.330) (12.665)
Age of establishment −0.016 −0.018 −0.400 −0.431
(0.009) (0.009) (0.251) (0.242)
log baseline tariff 2006 0.046 0.036 7.059 5.170
(0.170) (0.174) (4.933) (5.223)
Controls
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 160 117 117 160 117 117
p-value of joint significance of FE 0.000 0.000
Notes: Change in import status corresponds to −1 if the firm stopped importing, 0 if the firm did not change its 
import status, and 1 if the firm started to import.
Source: Enterprise Surveys conducted by the author in 2006 and 2010
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and exit during the tariff liberalization episode. However, the fact that the sample 
consists exclusively of incumbent firms should, if anything, introduce an upward 
bias in the estimates. In theory, incumbent firms should face lower search costs for 
new or enhanced sources of supply and as such, would be more capable of adjusting 
import volumes in the  short run.10 
The inclusion of industry fixed effects, the fact that we can reject that they are 
jointly zero, and the inclusion of a control group of products unaffected by the tariff 
change suggests that low import demand elasticities cannot be fully explained by 
the standard hypotheses discussed in the literature such as imperfect competition or 
other forms of  time-invariant  nontariff barriers like transport costs. The next section 
explores an alternative hypothesis: that low import demand elasticities may result 
from pervasive corruption that enables firms to circumvent high tariffs in the first 
place. Corruption could effectively dampen the impact of tariff liberalization on 
actual trade costs, and consequently, on traded quantities.
III. The Import Process, Tariffs, and Opportunities for Corruption
Each  firm-level import goes through several steps in order to clear through an 
international border. For analytical purposes, I define two broad stages in the import 
process that are managed by public officials who differ in their administrative 
authority and in their discretion to stop cargo and generate opportunities for bribe 
payments: customs and port operations.
Sequeira and Djankov (2014, p. 282) discuss, in detail, the role of the different 
agents involved in the import process and how bribery can occur: “customs’ offi-
cials are in charge of validating clearance documentation and collecting all tariff 
payments due.” As a result, they have “more discretionary power to extract bribes 
relative to regular port operators, given their broader bureaucratic mandate and the 
fact that they can access full information on each shipment, and each shipper, at all 
times.” In particular, customs officials can allow a firm to engage in tariff evasion 
through three different channels: “by misreporting physical quantities of imported 
products, by misrepresenting prices, or by misclassifying products from high to low 
tariff categories.” Customs officials have an additional set of tools they can deploy 
to extract bribes, namely the threat of conducting “a physical inspection of the ship-
ment (which can delay clearance for up to four days), or citing irregularities (real or 
fictitious) with the documentation of the shipment.” 
While customs officials have a broad toolkit of bribe extraction methods to draw 
on, “selling” tariff evasion is likely to be the most  cost-effective method. Associating 
the bribe with tariff evasion combines the desirable “features of reducing both the 
informational costs of  bribe-setting and the risk associated with the illicit transac-
tion” (Sequeira and Djankov 2014, p. 289). The tariff grouping a good falls under is 
a reasonable predictor of a shipper’s willingness to pay a bribe. From the perspective 
of the customs official, a common assumption is that shippers benefit from evading 
tariff duties so willingness to pay a bribe should be an “increasing function of the 
10 Note that these estimates contrast with the results in Section IIA where I identify a small but positive response 
of imports to the tariff decline. This discrepancy might be explained by the relatively small sample of firms included 
in the firm analysis, the more limited time horizon, and the fact that it covers incumbent firms only. 
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tariff rate. All other bribe extraction tools can potentially yield lower bribe revenue, 
as they rely on observing shipment characteristics that carry coarse information on 
a shipper’s willingness to pay a bribe. This informational asymmetry can then force 
customs officials to engage in a costly, risky, and  time-consuming exercise to elicit 
information on the  time-sensitivity of the shipment, or on the shipper’s ability to 
pay a bribe.” For example, the size of the shipment may not be a good predictor of 
a shipper’s willingness to pay a bribe: “large shipments could signal a firm carrying 
higher than average inventories with a lower willingness to pay a bribe to expedite 
clearance, or a large firm with a higher ability to pay for a faster service. A lengthy 
process of discovering both commitment to an illicit transaction and the reservation 
costs of a shipper increases both the risk and the cost of setting bribes” (Sequeira and 
Djankov 2014, p. 289). A corruption deal based on tariff evasion has the additional 
benefit of “lowering the risk of detection of bribe payments since neither side impli-
cated in the bribery deal will have an incentive to deviate from it, resulting in a more 
credible commitment (Schelling 1956).” (Sequeira and Djankov 2014, p. 289).
The fact that customs officials have significant bureaucratic latitude to extract 
different types of bribes suggests, however, that a widespread tariff removal scheme 
carries a higher probability of corruption being displaced from “selling” tariff eva-
sion into other forms of bribe extraction. Following Yang (2008a), the magnitude 
of displacement is, however, likely to be limited by the fact that alternative forms 
of bribe extraction have higher fixed and variable costs than those associated with 
bribes for tariff evasion.
Sequeira and Djankov (2014, p. 282) further discuss the role of other public 
agents involved in the clearance process. “Regular port operators have a narrower 
mandate to move or protect cargo on the docks, and they sometimes lack access to 
the shipment’s documentation specifying its value or the details of the client firm,” 
among others. Bribes can be paid to different types of port officials along different 
stages of the clearing process, such as agents in charge of “adjusting reefer tem-
peratures for refrigerated cargo stationed at the port; port gate officials who deter-
mine the acceptance of late cargo arrivals; stevedores who auction off forklifts and 
equipment on the docks; and scanner agents who move cargo through  nonintrusive 
scanning technology.”
The other “type of player involved in the import process is the clearing agent. In 
this setting, by law, no firm is allowed to interact directly with customs or port oper-
ators. Firms have to instead resort to private clearing agents who specialize in clear-
ing cargo through the port or border post, mostly through ad hoc,  shipment-based 
contracts. Clearing agents submit all the required documentation, monitor the clear-
ance process, and make all necessary payments to customs officials and port oper-
ators, including bribes. While their services are optional in the United States and in 
other European countries, they have been made a mandatory fixture of the clearing 
process in several countries throughout the developing world.”11
All three players have opportunities to engage in corruption and increase or 
decrease trade costs for firms. The following sections document the extent of 
 corruption associated with the import process in Mozambique, and examine how 
11 For more detailed information on the role of clearing agents see World Trade Organization, Documents 
Online, WTO Trade Policy Reviews, http://docsonline.wto.org/ (accessed August 2016). 
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the tariff liberalization scheme affected both the level and the type of corruption 
engaged in by customs officials, port operators, shippers, and clearing agents.
A. Corruption: Evidence from Trade Gaps
The most commonly used measure of corruption in the trade literature is the trade 
gap between declared exports by sending countries and declared imports by receiv-
ing countries (Bhagwati 1964; Fisman and Wei 2004; Javorcik and Narciso 2008). 
In theory, importers have a stronger incentive to misreport values or quantities of 
imports, widening this trade gap (Bhagwati 1964).
Beyond measurement, a standard econometric challenge when measuring the 
impact of tariff changes on corruption is to establish a credible counterfactual that 
can capture time trends in overall corruption patterns or changes in the quality of 
tariff enforcement across time. The staggered phase out of tariffs associated with 
the SADC Trade Protocol in southern Africa created a plausible control category 
of products that did not experience a change in tariff rates during the period under 
analysis. This allows for a straightforward  difference-in-differences approach that 
purges the empirical estimates of time trends in the use of various  bribe-extraction 
methods, as well as general changes in enforcement that should affect imports of all 
products equally. These include changes in rules conditioning clearance procedures 
or in the salaries of border officials, among others. I estimate the impact of the tariff 
liberalization scheme on corruption patterns through the following specification:
(4) log Trade Ga p it =  γ 1 Tarif f Change Categor y i × POST
 + μPOST +  γ 2 Tarif f Change Categor y i 
 +  β 2 Baseline Tarif f i +  ϵ it ,
where the  Log Trade Ga  p it is either the natural log of the gap in reported quantities, 
in reported values, or in the reported unit value of all products  i in year  t , exported 
from South Africa into Mozambique. The  difference-in-differences estimator inter-
acts an indicator identifying products that changed tariff in 2008 with an indicator 
for the years following 2008 ( POST ). The rationale for a binary treatment effect is 
twofold: the removal of tariffs was an absorbing state since no product experienced 
a reinstatement of the tariff and all tariffs were reduced from above the median tariff 
rate to zero, but also because of a common practice in customs to single out goods 
with a positive tariff rate for additional scrutiny.
Table 5 reveals that higher tariffs are associated with higher gaps in reported 
quantities, which suggests that the primary means of tariff evasion occurs through 
the  under-reporting of quantities. Products experiencing a decline in tariffs were 
associated with a reduction in the reported quantity gap: a 1 percent decrease in the 
tariff rate was associated with a 20 percent reduction in the trade gap in quantities. 
The trade gaps measured in terms of reported values or unit values were insensitive 
to the tariff change.
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Bribery for tariff evasion is, however, only one form of corruption that can affect 
trade costs. A plausible hypothesis discussed in the previous section is that the tar-
iff removal displaced corruption into other forms of bribe extraction, with poten-
tial implications for  firm-level trade costs. And yet, the trade gap measure is not 
 well-suited to uncover all possible displacement effects and their magnitudes. To 
examine the extent of overall corruption associated with imports and how it affected 
changes in trade costs, I turn to a novel dataset of directly observed bribe payments 
during the import process.
B. Corruption: Evidence from Primary Data on Bribe Payments
To measure corruption associated with imports, I collected primary data on 
bribe payments through an audit study that tracked a random sample of over 1,000 
shipments going through the port of Maputo in Mozambique and the border post 
between Mozambique and South Africa. For sampling purposes, I began by creating 
a list of all official clearing agents in the region under study. The majority (76 per-
cent) were independent clearing agents working for several client firms, with 50 per-
cent of them handling between 5 to 50 shipments per month. Fifteen clearing agents 
were then randomly selected to participate in the study, out of a universe of 117. 
Four of these were stationed at the border post while the remainder were working at 
the port of Maputo. Clearing agents provided the list of shipments they expected to 
handle, prior to their arrival at the border. They were then instructed to track every 
third shipment, providing detailed information on the date, time of arrival, and date 
Table 5—Trade Gaps and Tariff Levels, 2006–2014
log trade gap
Quantity Value Unit value Quantity Value Unit value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log tariff 0.201 0.055 −0.013
(0.042) (0.035) (0.010)
Treated products × POST −0.493 −0.083 0.022
(0.097) (0.077) (0.031)
Treated products 0.308 −0.092 0.104
(0.243) (0.219) (0.087)
POST 0.385 0.118 0.394
(0.086) (0.068) (0.028)
log baseline tariff 0.245 0.271 −0.051
(0.114) (0.098) (0.043)
Observations 21,884 21,884 21,861 21,884 21,884 21,861
Mean of dependent variable 0.273 0.213 2.176 0.273 0.213 2.178
R2 0.187 0.165 0.675 0.170 0.155 0.422
Notes: Trade gap corresponds to the difference between quantities, price, and unit values reported by exporters 
in South Africa and the equivalent figures reported by importers in Mozambique. The treated products indicator 
equals 1 if products experienced a change in tariff in 2008 and 0 otherwise. POST corresponds to the periods after 
the 2008 tariff change.
Sources: United Nations COMTRADE database and Mozambican customs tariff code 
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of clearance; and on a wide range of cargo characteristics such as size, value, and 
product type. Clearing agents also noted the primary recipients of bribes, the bribe 
amounts requested, and the reason for a bribe payment, ranging from the need to 
jump a long queue of trucks to get into the port, to evading tariffs, or lacking import-
ant clearance documentation.
The questionnaire used in this audit exercise was  co-designed with the clearing 
agents who participated in the study to ensure that it captured the most relevant 
features of the import process and, more importantly, that it accommodated any con-
fidentiality concerns regarding how much information clearing agents were willing 
to report. One such sensitive dimension related to information on the characteristics 
of client firms. To satisfy the clearing agents’ participation constraint, the question-
naire only collected information on the average size of the client firm.
Throughout the data collection exercise, emphasis was placed on capturing all 
formal and informal costs of importing goods through the port and border post, in 
order to minimize the possibility of clearing agents strategically misreporting data 
only on bribe payments. In this setting, there appeared to be limited stigma attached 
to the payment of bribes to border officials, since clearing agents saw the bribe as a 
necessary payment made at the request of their client firms. Acting as mere interme-
diaries, clearing agents felt limited moral responsibility for their actions (Sequeira 
2012; Sequeira and Djankov 2014). To directly test for misreporting, clearing agents 
were randomly assigned to being shadowed by surveyors during the clearance pro-
cess. Surveyors were tasked with documenting all payments made through the clear-
ance process. In the end,  self-administration of the audit survey appears, however, 
to have led to a more truthful elicitation of bribes (see Section IVE for a discussion 
of this monitoring experiment).
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics of corruption patterns before and after the 
tariff change took place. The audit study revealed that corruption was pervasive prior 
to the main 2008 tariff change, with bribe payments occurring for about 80 percent 
of all shipments tracked. Bribes were sizable in absolute terms (the mean bribe was 
US$128 per tonnage), which was equivalent to 149 percent of overall port costs and 
14 percent of the cost of shipping a container between the Far East and Mozambique 
(shipping includes costs with overland transport, port fees, and ocean shipping). 
Consistent with a  long-standing result in the literature, the Tullock Paradox, bribes 
were small relative to the rent captured by the firms avoiding the tariffs: the amount 
of bribe paid corresponded to approximately 7 percent of the tariff amount due.12
Table 6 further shows that bribes were unlikely to be buying speed in the clear-
ance process even after the tariff change since there was no correlation between the 
payment of a bribe and clearance speed (Cudmore and Whalley 2005). The descrip-
tive evidence suggests instead that bribes were paid primarily to customs officials to 
buy tariff evasion. This is consistent with the evidence from the trade gaps examined 
in the previous section.
12 Note that the clearing agents did not report precisely what percentage of the tariff duty was paid by the firm, 
in spite of the bribe. Clearing agents provided instead a general rule of thumb, in which the value or the quantity of 
the good was underreported by 50 percent in exchange for the bribe. The 7 percent figure results from a back of the 
envelope calculation based on this figure. 
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Table 7 shows that most product and shipper characteristics, with the exception 
of whether the product was an agricultural good, are associated with a significant 
decline in the probability of paying a bribe and in the amount of bribe paid. These 
characteristics are directly controlled for in Section IIIB’s regression analysis of the 
impact of the tariff change on corruption patterns.
Tariff Liberalization and Changes in Corruption.—To identify a causal 
relationship between changes in tariff rates and changes in corruption, I fit a 
 difference-in-differences model to pooled  cross sections of shipments audited 
between 2007 and 2013. In the main specification, the dependent variable is denoted 
by  y it for shipment  i in period  t , which corresponds to a binary variable equaling 1 if a 
bribe was paid and 0 otherwise. To formally identify the determinants of the amount 
of bribe paid, conditional on paying a bribe, the dependent variable  y it becomes 
the natural log of the amount of bribe paid, for each shipment  i . In both cases, the 
 difference-in-differences estimator interacts a binary variable that equals 1 if the 
product shipped experienced a tariff change in 2008 and 0 otherwise; with the vari-
able  POST taking the value 1 after the 2008 change in tariffs, and 0 before then.
(5)  y it =  γ 1 Tarif f Change Categor y i × POST + μPOST 
 +  γ 2 Tarif f Change Categor y i +  β 2 Baseline Tarif f i +  Γ i 
 +  p i +  ω t +  δ i +  ϵ it . 
Table 6—Summary Statistics: Bribe Payments
Pre- Post-
tariff change tariff change
2007 2008 2011–2012
Probability of paying a bribe (percent) 80 26 16
Avg bribe amount per ton 2,164 280 494
 (Metical 2007, CPI adjusted) (7,800) (963) (2,746)
Primary bribe recipient Customs (97%) Customs (84%) Customs (72%)
Primary reason for bribe payment Tariff evasion (61%) Congestion (59%) Congestion (38%)
Ratio of bribe amount to tariff duties 0.07 0.028 0.008
 saved [0–1]* (0.13) (0.09) (0.02)
Average clearing time for all shipments (days) 2.6 2.6 2.6
(2.2) (1.3) (3.6)
Average clearing time with the payment 2.6 2.2 2.4
 of a bribe (days) (2.3) (1.0) (3.1)
Average clearing time without the payment 1.9 2.7 2.6
 of a bribe (days) (1.2) (1.4) (3.7)
Average clearing time with bribe payment for 2.7 2.4 2.4
  tariff evasion (days) (2.4) (1.0) (1.8)
Notes: Average clearing times moved in tandem with increases in the overall volume of cargo handled at the port 
between 2007 and 2011. Total volumes increased by 13 percent in 2008 and 18 percent in 2011. Note that in 2009, 
the port of Maputo was still functioning at 30 percent of capacity so it was capable of handling the observed increase 
in volumes without substantially increasing congestion. 
* Conditional on the bribe being paid for tariff evasion. 
Source: Audit study conducted by the author
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The coefficient of interest is  γ 1 , which captures the difference in the probability 
of paying a bribe for products that changed tariff level, before and after the tariff 
change took place, relative to products that did not experience any change in tariffs 
throughout the period under analysis. The main specification includes a vector of 
product, shipment, clearing agent, and  firm-level characteristics  Γ i . These controls 
include a dummy variable signaling if the shipper is a large firm (defined as having 
more than 100 employees); dummy variables categorizing the product as perishable, 
as an agricultural good or as a shipment  pre-inspected at origin. It also controls for 
the terminal in which the cargo was cleared. Industry, year, and clearing agent fixed 
effects are captured by  p i ,  ω t , and  δ i , respectively.13 Standard errors are clustered 
at the level of the product’s four-digit HS classification to allow for within product 
category correlation across time.
A growing literature suggests that products lacking internationally set prices may 
be more prone to corrupt practices due to the difficulty in assessing their actual value. 
In these situations, honest customs officials find it more difficult to detect an invoice 
stating an incorrect price, thus creating an incentive for importers to  under-report 
the value of the product, while corrupt customs officials have a plausible excuse 
for why they did not detect underinvoicing in the fist place. I follow the classifica-
tion conventionally used in the literature to identify differentiated products as those 
13 Given limited degrees of freedom, three clearing agents with fewer than 50 shipments each are clustered into 
one category of clearing agent fixed effect. Removing the clearing agent fixed effects leaves the results unchanged 
as shown in online Appendix Table 2. 
Table 7—Bribes Before and After the Tariff Change: By Shipper and Product Characteristics
Pre- Post-
tariff tariff Difference
change change p-value
Panel A. Probability of paying a bribe ( percent)
Large firm 96 16 0.000
Medium to small firm 67 18 0.000
Agricultural product 13 12 0.739
Differentiated product 77 18 0.000
Pre-inspected shipment 68 10 0.000
Panel B. Amount of bribe paid per ton (Mtn, CPI adjusted )
Large firm 3,373 150 0.004
(1,419) (75)
Medium to small firm 3,882 503 0.000
(1,711) (85)
Agricultural product 1,404 615 0.144
(922) (143)
Differentiated product 2,062 537 0.000
(623) (90)
Pre-inspected shipment 2,597 661 0.000
1,136 130
Notes: Panel B reports standard errors in parenthesis. The t-tests for equality of means reported in panel B assume 
unequal variances. Large firms are defined as having more than 100 employees. Differentiated products correspond 
to products that lack a reference international price (as defined in Rauch 1999). The pre-inspected shipment dummy 
variable denotes whether a shipment was inspected at origin.
Source: Audit study conducted by the author 
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that lack an international reference price according to Rauch (1999).14 Examples 
of  differentiated goods are clothes and cars, while  non-differentiated goods could 
be oil or wheat. Rauch’s (conservative) classification is at the  four-digit SITC level, 
which I match to the bribe data based on the concordance in Feenstra (1996).
I then adjust the treatment variable to directly exploit the magnitude of the varia-
tion in tariffs experienced by different products. In this specification, the dependent 
variable captures the percentage point reduction in the tariff level experienced by 
each product.
Table 8 presents the results on the determinants of the probability of paying a 
bribe. Products that changed tariff level in 2008 are associated with a sizable decline 
(30 percent) in the probability of paying a bribe. When exploiting the magnitude of 
the tariff reduction, I find that a 10 percent decline in the tariff rate is associated with 
a 22 percent decline in the probability of paying a bribe. These changes are signifi-
cantly different from zero, even with the most stringent specification that includes 
product, industry, and clearing agent fixed effects. The results are also robust to 
the inclusion of interactions between the  post-treatment indicator ( POST ) and the 
covariates of interest, as shown in columns 2 and 4. I find no robust evidence in 
the data that shipping an agricultural, perishable, or a differentiated product had an 
impact on the probability of paying a bribe, before or after the tariff change.15
Table 9 shows that the tariff removal also led to a significant decline in the amount 
of bribes paid, conditional on the payment of a bribe. A 1 percent decline in the tariff 
rate is associated with a 20 percent decline in the amount of bribe paid.16 To test the 
robustness of the results, I approach the data with a hurdle model estimated in lev-
els, given the count nature of the variable capturing the amount of bribes paid. This 
 two-stage estimation procedure fits a logit model to first distinguish between zero 
and positive counts, and then a  zero-truncated negative binomial model is fitted to 
the positive counts, in levels. A negative binomial model is favored over a truncated 
Poisson distribution given  over-dispersion in the bribe data. This estimation pro-
cedure accounts for the high occurrence of zeros in the dependent variable.17 The 
hurdle model estimates in columns 5 through 8 confirm the results obtained with the 
ordinary least squares model, though lack of convergence prevents the inclusion of 
the full set of controls in the model.
I also examine the impact of the change in tariffs on bribes measured as a share of 
the shipment value and as a share of the shipment tonnage. Tables 10 and 11 show 
these results, replacing the dependent variable in equation (5) with an indicator of 
bribes as a share of the shipment value and as a share of the shipment size. In both 
14 Several studies have examined the relationship between differentiated goods and tariff evasion, only to find 
mixed results. Fisman and Wei (2004) failed to find a significant relationship between differentiated goods and tariff 
evasion whereas Javorcik and Narciso (2008) and Mishra, Subramanian, and Topalova (2008) find that the positive 
relationship between tariff evasion and tariff levels is stronger for differentiated goods. 
15 Results are also robust to the inclusion of several temperature controls interacted with the perishability of the 
good. Results are available upon request. 
16 All estimates are also robust to the inclusion of an interaction term between the level of the baseline tariff 
and both the value and the volume of the shipment. This accounts for the possibility that the “size of the pie” from 
which bribes can be extracted would affect the probability of paying a bribe and the bribe level paid (results not 
shown but available upon request). 
17 Note that the zeros observed in the variable “amount of bribe paid” are not sampling zeros, but structural 
zeros in the sense that they are only determined by shipments that do not pay a bribe. For those paying a bribe, this 
variable cannot be zero. 
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cases, the  difference-in-differences estimates are negative and significant suggesting 
that the tariff removal was associated with a decline in both the absolute and the 
relative size of bribes. An important distinction relative to the results from previous 
specifications is that large firms are no longer associated with larger bribes when 
taking into account the size and value of their shipments.
Overall, the data from the audit study on actual bribe payments suggest that 
bribes were frequent but small relative to the reduction in tariff costs they could 
buy for firms prior to the tariff change. This can potentially explain the trade elas-
ticities identified in Section II: corruption enabled firms to significantly reduce their 
Table 8—Difference-in-Differences: Determinants of the Probability of Paying a Bribe
Probability of paying a bribe [0–1]
linear probability model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tariff change category × POST −0.429 −0.296
(0.131) (0.120)
Tariff change category 0.448 0.357
(0.111) (0.099)
Tariff reduction × POST −0.025 −0.021
(0.008) (0.007)
Tariff reduction 0.024 0.022
(0.005) (0.009)
POST −0.089 −0.555 −0.111 −0.686
(0.106) (0.203) (0.116) (0.241)
Differentiated product 0.065 0.018 0.032 −0.076
(0.078) (0.102) (0.071) (0.109)
Agricultural product 0.026 −0.221 0.046 0.041
(0.030) (0.096) (0.029) (0.030)
Pre-shipment inspection −0.010 0.061 0.003 0.087
(0.010) (0.061) (0.020) (0.07)
Perishable product −0.047 0.260 −0.052 0.137
(0.067) (0.109) (0.064) (0.124)
Large firm 0.058 0.161 0.066 0.172
(0.047) (0.055) (0.051) (0.066)
log shipment value per ton 0.014 −0.035 0.017 −0.034
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013)
Controls
Clearing agent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product four-digit HS code Yes Yes Yes Yes
Terminal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of the week arrival Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product from South Africa Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline tariff Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates × POST No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084
F-statistic 218.28 3,308.08 313.90 604.80
R2 0.36 0.39 0.35 0.37
Notes: The dependent variable equals 1 if a bribe was paid and 0 otherwise. The tariff change category indica-
tor equals 1 if the product experienced a tariff change in 2008 and 0 otherwise. The tariff reduction variable cor-
responds to the percentage point reduction in tariffs experienced by each product in 2008. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the level of the four-digit HS code.
Sources: Audit study conducted by the author and Mozambican customs tariff code 
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tariff bills, at a relatively low cost. The removal of both tariffs and bribe payments 
 combined might not have significantly changed trade costs for firms, and conse-
quently, their import decisions.
In online Appendix Section IA, I  reestimate trade elasticities replacing the nom-
inal tariff rate with the implicit tariff rate determined by actual tariff evasion levels 
(based on the audit study), before and after the reduction in tariffs took place. This 
Table 9—Difference-in-Differences: Determinants of the Amount of Bribe Paid
log bribe amount paid
Ordinary least squares Hurdle model
logit Negative logit Negative
binomial binomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tariff change category −3.748 −2.928 −30.735 −0.079
 × POST (1.075) (0.944) (1.995) (0.459)
Tariff change category 3.632 3.156 30.704 −0.916
(0.953) (0.803) (1.898) (0.436)
Tariff reduction × POST −0.225 −0.191 −2.996 −0.089
(0.058) (0.064) (0.174) (0.031)
Tariff reduction 0.200 0.191 2.969 −0.042
(0.042) (0.0478) (0.171) (0.0260)
POST −0.678 −3.449 −0.864 −4.652 −0.392 −0.633 −0.371 −0.426
(0.867) (1.818) (0.944) (2.152) (0.639) (0.179) (0.634) (0.200)
Differentiated product 0.545 −0.121 0.303 −0.925 −0.0450 0.188 −0.104 0.304
(0.648) (0.849) (0.603) (0.876) (0.660) (0.423) (0.643) (0.427)
Agricultural product 0.161 −1.968 0.343 0.337 0.356 0.583 0.327 0.229
(0.285) (0.931) (0.265) (0.243) (0.365) (0.563) (0.355) (0.494)
Pre-shipment inspection −0.227 0.376 −0.137 0.641 −0.122 −0.550 −0.102 −0.595
(0.208) (0.628) (0.197) (0.712) (0.215) (0.182) (0.207) (0.189)
Perishable product −0.084 3.400 −0.119 2.299 −0.551 0.311 −0.711 0.768
(0.616) (0.845) (0.586) (0.949) (1.147) (0.787) (1.167) (0.748)
Large firm 0.600 1.593 0.662 1.708 1.137 0.270 1.198 0.277
(0.389) (0.486) (0.431) (0.585) (0.610) (0.391) (0.618) (0.393)
log shipment value per ton 0.130 −0.221 0.152 −0.217 0.160 −0.037 0.158 −0.035
(0.074) (0.079) (0.073) (0.095) (0.088) (0.079) (0.088) (0.077)
Controls
Clearing agent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product four-digit HS code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Terminal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of the week arrival Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product from South Africa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline tariff Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates × POST No Yes No Yes No No No No
Observations 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084
Mean of dependent variable 1.486 1.486 1.486 1.486 1.486 1.486 1.486 1.486
F-statistic 265.38 3,937.63 422.36 188.25
R2 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.37
log pseudo-likelihood −2,243.93 −2,243.58
Notes: Columns 1 through 4 denote estimates for an ordinary least squares model, with the dependent variable rep-
resenting the logarithmic form of the amount of bribe paid, conditional on paying a bribe. Columns 5 through 8 
fit a hurdle model with a truncated negative binomial, in levels, to ensure convergence. The negative binomial is 
preferred over a truncated Poisson model due to over-dispersion in the bribe amount variable. Tariff change cate-
gory equals 1 if the product experienced a tariff change in 2008 and 0 otherwise. Tariff reduction corresponds to 
the magnitude of the tariff reduction experienced by each product in 2008. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
level of the four-digit HS code.
Sources: Audit study conducted by the author and Mozambican customs tariff code
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exercise leads to higher estimates of trade elasticities, as shown in Table 1 (ranging 
from a 24 percent to a  five-fold increase, depending on the specifications). These 
adjusted estimates are closer to the average trade elasticities estimated in the litera-
ture based on  time-series variation in tariffs. These results further suggest that tariff 
evasion is a potential explanation for the observed smaller elasticities computed in 
Section IIB.
Table 10—Difference-in-Differences: Bribes as a Share of Shipment Value
log bribe amount paid as a share of shipment value
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tariff change category × POST −0.010 −0.010
(0.003) (0.004)
Tariff change category 0.010 0.010
(0.003) (0.004)
Tariff reduction × POST −0.001 −0.001
(0.0580) (0.0642)
Tariff reduction 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
POST −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.003
(0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.011)
Differentiated product 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.005
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Agricultural product −0.001 −0.004 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Pre-shipment inspection −0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Perishable product 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Large firm −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
log shipment tonnage −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 −0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Controls
Clearing agent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product four-digit HS code Yes Yes Yes Yes
Terminal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of the week arrival Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product from South Africa Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline tariff Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates × POST No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084
Mean of dependent variable 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
F-statistic 5.93 3.61 9.77 6.80
R2 0.435 0.461 0.431 0.452
Notes: Columns 1 through 4 denote estimates from an ordinary least squares model, with the dependent variable 
representing the logarithmic form  [log (x + 1) ] of the amount of bribe paid as a share of the value of the shipment, 
conditional on paying a bribe. Tariff change category equals 1 if the product experienced a tariff change in 2008 
and 0 otherwise. Tariff reduction corresponds to the magnitude of the tariff reduction experienced by each product 
in 2008. Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the four-digit HS code.
Sources: Audit study conducted by the author and Mozambican customs tariff code 
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IV. Robustness Checks
A.  Nontariff Barriers
A potential concern is that both the trade elasticities and the corruption analyses 
may be driven by other determinants of trade costs such as  nontariff barriers. To 
check this possibility, in Table 12, I  reestimate trade elasticities through  equation (1) 
Table 11—Difference-in-Differences: Bribe Amounts Paid as a Share of Shipment Tonnage
log bribe amount paid as a share of shipment tonnage
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tariff change category × POST −1.914 −1.597
(0.504) (0.462)
Tariff change category 1.875 1.680
(0.465) (0.427)
Tariff reduction × POST −0.089 −0.084
(0.026) (0.027)
Tariff reduction 0.084 0.087
(0.022) (0.023)
POST −0.274 −3.003 −0.420 −3.713
(0.318) (1.237) (0.393) (1.527)
Differentiated product 0.182 −0.079 0.085 −0.375
(0.258) (0.439) (0.234) (0.420)
Agricultural product 0.117 −0.701 0.198 0.129
(0.128) (0.441) (0.112) (0.102)
Pre-shipment inspection −0.104 0.299 −0.056 0.491
(0.082) (0.424) (0.077) (0.471)
Perishable product 0.410 2.110 0.389 1.607
(0.324) (0.381) (0.307) (0.513)
Large firm −0.202 −0.253 −0.162 −0.155
(0.241) (0.470) (0.264) (0.500)
log shipment value −0.001 −0.173 0.001 −0.189
(0.031) (0.072) (0.032) (0.083)
Controls
Clearing agent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product four-digit HS code Yes Yes Yes Yes
Terminal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of the week arrival Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product from South Africa Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline tariff Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates × POST No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084
Mean of dependent variable 0.451 0.451 0.451 0.451
F-statistic 23.66 36.26 21.38 18.58
R2 0.249 0.279 0.228 0.262
Notes: Columns 1 through 4 denote estimates for an ordinary least squares model, with the dependent variable rep-
resenting the logarithmic form of the amount of bribe paid as a share of the value of the shipment, conditional on 
paying a bribe. Tariff change category equals 1 if the product experienced a tariff change in 2008 and 0 otherwise. 
Tariff reduction corresponds to the magnitude of the tariff reduction experienced by each product in 2008. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the level of the four-digit HS code.
Source: Audit study conducted by the author and Mozambican customs tariff code
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on a restricted sample that excludes agricultural products (corresponding to HS 
codes 010111 to 530599), which tend to be particularly affected by  nontariff bar-
riers. As shown in column 4, the estimated trade elasticity coefficient is larger than 
before, but still close to 0.1. Note that in the corruption analysis, the main specifica-
tions control for whether the shipment includes an agricultural product and for addi-
tional  nontariff barriers such as whether the shipment was subjected to  pre-shipment 
inspection at origin.
Another important  nontariff barrier to trade can be excessively high transport 
costs or lack of transport infrastructure altogether. To assess this possibility, I exam-
ine an indicator of the state of logistics and transport in different economies world-
wide, constructed by the World Bank. This Logistics Performance Index measures 
perceptions on a country’s logistics, based on the efficiency of customs clearance, 
the quality of trade, and  transport-related infrastructure. These can include the ease 
of arranging competitively priced shipments, the ability to track and trace consign-
ments, and the frequency with which shipments reach the consignee within the 
scheduled time. The index ranges from 1 to 5 with a higher score representing better 
performance. South Africa, where most of the trade corridor of interest in the anal-
ysis is located, kept its score stable between 2007 and 2014 at 3.46. The index for 
Mozambique stayed close to the  subcontinent’s average at 2.29. These figures are 
also not significantly different from those of other  middle-income or developing 
Table 12—Tariff Liberalization and Unit Value of Imports, 2006–2014:  
Excluding Agricultural Products
log share unit value
Fixed First Long Instrumental
effects differences differences variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. 2 SLS Estimate
log tariff rate −0.060 −0.101
(0.036) (0.046)
 Δ log tariff rate −0.013 −0.061
(0.023) (0.021)
B. First stage
dep. var.
log tariff rate
Lagged log tariff rate (one period) 0.861
(0.0626)
Lagged log tariff rate (two periods) −0.076
(0.020)
Baseline tariff rate 2006 −0.057
(0.003)
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 136.211
Observations 13,292 10,178 8,483  9,434
Mean of dependent variable  0.948  0.911  0.924  0.958
Notes: log share import volumes corresponds to the unit value of South African imports (in kgs) as a share of the 
total quantity of imports from the rest of the world into Mozambique, in logarithmic form. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the level of the product’s six-digit harmonization code.
Sources: United Nations COMTRADE database and Mozambican customs tariff code 
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countries such as India (3.1), Brazil (2.8), China (3.3), and in general, of developing 
countries in Latin America (2.5). Moreover, in the case of Mozambique, this figure 
masks significant heterogeneity in the quality of transport infrastructure across the 
country. The relevant transport corridor linking South Africa to Mozambique has 
received significant investments in the last 15 years that included a new port in 
Maputo (the capital), a new railroad, a new highway, and a new border post. It is 
currently being used at  30–40 percent of capacity and the Mozambican portion of 
the corridor is only 60 miles long (or 288 nautical miles in the case of cabotage 
shipment between the connecting ports in Mozambique and South Africa). Overall, 
inadequate transport infrastructure is unlikely to fully explain the estimated low 
elasticities given the relatively high quality of transport infrastructure in the trade 
corridor of interest for this study.
B. The Parallel Trend Assumption
The validity of the  difference-in-differences estimates in Sections IIIA and IIIB 
hinges on the key identifying assumption that in the absence of the tariff change, 
trends in the outcomes of interest would have been similar between products that 
changed tariffs and products that remained in the same tariff category. To directly 
test for the parallel trend hypothesis, I examine trends in the trade gaps of treatment 
and control products prior to the tariff change, in 2006 and 2007. While the trade 
gap can only capture corruption related to tariff evasion and smuggling, prior to 
the tariff change in 2008, tariff evasion appeared to be the most common form of 
corruption in the particular setting under study (see Section IIIB and Table 6). I 
 reestimate equation (4), but now interacting the treatment indicator with a dummy 
indicating the year 2007. Table 13 presents the results of this placebo test and for 
comparison, reproduces the results for the actual tariff liberalization occurring in 
2008. All the coefficients are insignificant and close to zero in the placebo specifica-
tion. While these results are limited to the two years prior to the tariff change due to 
the unavailability of data for previous periods, they lend support to the parallel trend 
assumption: in the absence of the tariff change, evasion rates would have remained 
similar across treatment and control products.
C. Sampling Bias
The firm survey conducted in 2006 and 2010 targeted 190 firms located in the 
trade corridor connecting Mozambique to South Africa. Attrition rates in the sec-
ond wave of the survey were approximately 15 percent. The assumption underlying 
the analysis of the firm data is that firms are missing from the panel at random. 
Standard tests for equality of means and equality of the distributions of important 
 firm-level characteristics for firms that stayed in the panel and those that exited, can-
not be rejected at conventional levels of significance (see Table 14). These variables 
include the size of the firm, its age, ownership structure, and sales levels at baseline. 
Data on some of the covariates of interest are also missing in the firm survey, further 
reducing the sample size to 117 firms. Table 14 also shows that firms that remained 
in the panel with full information on covariates of interest are not statistically differ-
ent from firms with missing data on covariates.
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D. Misreporting Aggregate Trade Flows
In theory, Mozambican importers have an incentive to  under-report quantities or 
values, or to misclassify products into different tariff groupings during periods of 
Table 13—The Parallel Trend Hypothesis: Aggregate Trade Flow Data
Quantity trade gap Value trade gap Unit value trade gap
Panel A. Trade gaps with placebo 2007 tariff liberalization
Tariff change category × POST 2007 −0.038 −0.006 −0.073
(0.134) (0.111) (0.053)
Tariff change category 0.031 −0.159 0.702
(0.227) (0.181) (0.142)
POST 2007 0.079 0.088 0.094
(0.118) (0.098) (0.045)
log baseline tariff 0.204 0.121 −0.088
(0.084) (0.067) (0.058)
Observations 4,655 5,423 4,640
R2 0.002 0.012 0.039
Panel B. Trade gaps with actual 2008 tariff liberalization
Treated products × POST 2008 −0.493 −0.083 0.022
(0.097) (0.077) (0.031)
Treated products 0.308 −0.092 0.104
(0.243) (0.219) (0.087)
log baseline tariff 0.245 0.271 −0.051
(0.114) (0.098) (0.043)
POST 0.385 0.118 0.394
(0.086) (0.068) (0.028)
Observations 21,884 21,884 21,861
R2 0.170 0.155 0.422
Notes: Tariff change category equals 1 if the product changed tariff category in 2008 and 0 otherwise. Log base-
line tariff rate represents the product’s tariff rate in 2006, in logarithmic form. Standard errors clustered at the four-
digit HS code.
Sources: United Nations COMTRADE database and Mozambican customs tariff code
Table 14—Firm Characteristics: Selection
Attrition panel Attrition covariates
t-test Kolmogorov-Smirnov χ2 t-test Kolmogorov-Smirnov χ2
p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value
Firm age 0.86 0.34 0.90 0.26
Sales in 2006 0.12 0.37 0.40 0.77
Number of workers in 2006 0.51 0.36 0.18 0.92
Percentage of imported inputs 0.73 0.85 0.24 0.45
Percentage female ownership 0.55 0.99 0.01 0.13
Firm exports in 2006 0.29 0.33
Ethnicity of firm manager 0.31 0.15
Notes: p-values for t-tests of equality of means of continuous variables firm age, sales in 2006, number of workers 
in 2006, and percentage of imported inputs (assuming unequal variances). Exact Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values for 
a non-parametric test of the equality of distributions of continuous variables and p-values for a χ2 test for equality 
of categorical variables.
Sources: Enterprise Surveys conducted by the author in 2006 and 2010 
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high tariffs, while reporting by South African exporters should be insensitive to the 
tariff grouping the good falls under (Bhagwati 1964). By construction, the trade gap 
measure used in Section IIIA captures not only differential incentives in reporting 
but also differences in transport costs and exchange rates, among others (for exam-
ple, exporters report values f.o.b. (freight on board), while importers report imports 
including c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight)). If the observed trade gap is indeed 
driven primarily by strategic misreporting on the Mozambican side, then the tariff 
reduction should, in principle, eliminate this incentive and lead to more accurate 
reporting of imports of these products. To test for this possibility and confirm that 
the trade gap is driven by misreporting and corruption occurring on the side of the 
importer, I fit equation (4) to the aggregate trade flow data, replacing as the depen-
dent variable the volume and value of import flows, as reported by Mozambican 
importers or South African exporters. Table 15 confirms that Mozambican importers 
reported higher volumes of imports for products that experienced a tariff reduction, 
but the tariff change elicited no differential change in reported volumes or values 
by South African exporters across treatment and control products. This result also 
confirms that prior to the tariff change, there was significant misreporting of quan-
tities by Mozambican importers to evade tariffs. One of the benefits of the tariff 
liberalization scheme was therefore to create incentives for more accurate reporting 
of trade flows by importers. This is particularly important given that exporters have 
less of an incentive to track exports carefully due to the absence of export duties.
E. Measurement Bias
To  cross-check the accuracy and reliability of the bribe data collected, I imple-
mented an experiment in which clearing agents were randomly assigned to sequences 
Table 15—Tariff Changes and Misreporting of Trade Flows
log volume (in kgs) log value
Mozambique South Africa Mozambique  South Africa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tariff change category × POST 0.456 −0.048 0.132 0.039
(0.092) (0.092) (0.075) (0.079)
Tariff change category −0.775 −0.390 0.714 0.619
(0.395) (0.429) (0.395) (0.388)
POST 0.136 0.526 0.463 0.594
(0.081) (0.081) (0.066) (0.069)
Controls
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product four-digit HS code fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,909 21,909 21,909 21,909
Mean of dependent variable 8.619 8.896 10.500 10.718
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Notes: Tariff change category equals 1 if the product experienced a tariff change in 2008 and 0 otherwise. POST 
indicator equals 1 for years 2008–2014 and 0 for years 2006–2007.
Sources: United Nations COMTRADE database and Mozambican customs tariff code 
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of monitored and unmonitored data collection. As described in Sequeira and Djankov 
(2014, p. 286), “the monitoring was conducted by  locally-hired observers who shad-
owed clearing agents and verified the accuracy of the data reported. The observers 
had experience in the shipping industry and were familiar with all clearance pro-
cedures. To minimize any suspicion, they were also similar in age and appearance 
to any clerk who normally assists clearing agents in their interactions with port 
officials.” Note that the clearing agents knew from the outset that they would be 
monitored at some point, making it “less likely that they would try to strategically 
misreport information on bribe payments while they were not being monitored.”
Table 16 displays the results from the experiment. When monitored, clearing 
agents reported fewer instances of bribe payments and lower bribe amounts paid (an 
11 to 17 percent decline in the probability of paying a bribe and a 60 percent decline 
in the amount of bribe paid). These results are robust to controlling for important 
cargo characteristics such as its size and value, for the characteristics of the client 
firm and the clearing agent, and for the timing of the shipments, among others.
As reported in Sequeira and Djankov (2014, p. 286) the observers participating 
in the monitoring exercise reported that “their presence had changed the nature of 
the interactions between the clearing agent and the public official, inhibiting certain 
illicit transactions.” Interestingly, this Hawthorne effect appears to have been less 
pronounced “in cases in which corruption may have been more “justified” such as 
Table 16—Monitoring Experiment
Bribe paid log bribe amount paid
Linear probability model OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Monitored shipment −0.100 −0.101 −0.200 −0.190 −0.951 −0.895 −1.647 −1.418(0.035) (0.025) (0.057) (0.080) (0.295) (0.179) (0.476) (0.639)
Monitored shipment 0.044 0.037 0.308 0.214
 × log tariff level (0.017) (0.027) (0.138) (0.216)
Controls
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Clearing agent No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Product four-digit HS code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Terminal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month arrival Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Differentiated product Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agricultural product Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Perishable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-inspected shipment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Large client firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of the week arrival Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
log value per ton Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
log tariff level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bulk (non-containerized) shipments Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 919 919 919 919 919 919 919 919
F-test 5.31 15.49 24.68 24.04 6.71 16.82 18.02 30.76
R2 0.05  0.09  0.05  0.09 0.04  0.08  0.04  0.08
Notes: In columns 1 through 4 the dependent variable equals 1 if a bribe was paid and 0 otherwise, while in col-
umns 5 through 8 the dependent variable corresponds to the amount of bribe paid in logarithmic form [ln(x + 1)]. 
Columns 1 through 4 fit linear probability models while columns 5 through 8 fit standard ordinary least squares. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the four-digit HS code for each product. 
Sources: Audit study conducted by the author 
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when the bribe was being paid for tariff evasion. In these cases, since both parties 
were benefiting from the illicit transaction, public officials may have felt less shame” 
(or less fear) in requesting a bribe in the presence of the observer, as suggested by 
the positive and marginally significant coefficients of the interaction between tariff 
level and whether a shipment was monitored (see columns 3, 4 , 7, and 8).
As discussed in Sequeira and Djankov (2014, p. 286) these results lend support to 
an extensive literature in psychology arguing that  “self-administered questionnaires 
increase the willingness of respondents to report sensitive behavior in a variety of 
settings” (Barnett 1998; Bradburn and Sudman 1979; Waterton and Duffy 1984; 
Groves 1989; Weinrott and Saylor 1991). The analysis in this paper therefore always 
controls for whether a shipment was monitored.
The main corruption results in Section IIIB also depend on the assumption that 
the error terms are uncorrelated with the measurement of bribes. This assumption 
would be violated if, among other reasons, the measure of bribes in the period 
 2007–2012 came from very different samples of products audited each year. The 
pattern of bribe payments observed could then be driven not by the tariff reduction 
but by changes in the composition of shipments in the sample. Table 17 shows the 
 p-values for a test of equality of means, assuming unequal variances, for important 
product and  shipment-level characteristics for each period. For the most part and for 
key variables such as the value of the shipments per ton, the  p-values suggest that 
the audited shipments are indeed comparable across time.
F. Displacement Effects
As described in Section III, bribe payments for duty avoidance are just a subset of 
the bribery deals available to border officials and firms during the import process. As 
officials attempt to protect bribe rents and private agents seek alternative  methods 
Table 17—Summary Statistics: Shipment Characteristics
Shipment characteristics Difference
Pre-post tariff change ( p-values)
Panel A All products Treatment products Control products
Average shipment value per ton 0.28 0.97 0.27
Percentage bulk cargo 0.83 0.93 0.69
Perishable product 0.47 0.01 0.04
Percentage of differentiated goods 0.71 0.003 0.16
Panel B High-High High-Low Low-Low
Average shipment value per ton 0.19 0.58 0.36
Percentage bulk cargo 0.01 0.20 0.53
Perishable product 0.001 0.000 0.56
Percentage of differentiated goods 0.03 0.01 0.06
Notes: The high-high grouping represents products that remained in the high tariff category; the high-low grouping 
represents products that went from high to low tariffs and the low-low grouping represents products that remained 
in a low tariff category throughout the period under analysis. Bulk represents non-containerized cargo. For the con-
tinuous variable average shipment value per ton, t-test for equality of means, accounting for unequal variances. For 
all other binary variables, the p-value corresponds to a χ2 test.
Source: Audit study conducted by the author
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to reduce the cost of clearing goods through borders, changes in tariff schedules 
can affect not only the levels of tariff evasion but also the broader set of corrupt 
interactions both parties engage in.18 If displacement effects are large, they could 
significantly change the interpretation of the main results on the impact of the tariff 
liberalization scheme on corruption and, consequently, on trade costs. If corruption 
were displaced from  cost-reducing tariff evasion to other forms of  cost-increasing 
extortionary bribes, then these displacement effects could be an alternative explana-
tion to the observed low estimated trade elasticities.
To examine the potential displacement of corruption caused by the tariff change, 
I track bribe payments along the entire chain of complementary stages in the clear-
ance of imported goods. Prior to the tariff change, the most frequently cited reason 
for a bribe payment to customs was tariff evasion. Following the 2008 tariff change, 
the most common type of bribe extraction involved selling “speed” in the clearance 
queue, overlooking irregularities with the clearance documentation (real or ficti-
tious), or allowing the cargo to skip normal clearing procedures such as the scanning 
process. While overall port volumes increased during the period under study (by 
13 percent in 2008 and 18 percent in 2011), clearing times remained fairly stable, 
in part given significant excess infrastructural capacity in the trade corridor. There 
is also no statistically significant difference in clearing times between products that 
paid and did not pay bribes, before and after the tariff change, as shown in Table 6.
To examine potential displacement effects in the type of corruption associated 
with imports, I test whether products experiencing a tariff reduction also experienced 
any change in the type of bribes paid. The audit study captured whether a bribe pay-
ment was of the collusive type (i.e., if the rent generated from the illicit transaction 
was shared between the public official and the firm), or coercive in nature (i.e., if 
the rent was mostly captured by the public official) (Sequeira and Djankov 2014). 
I replace the dependent variable in equation (5) with a binary variable representing 
the probability of paying a coercive bribe, conditional on the payment of a bribe. 
This analysis is restricted to the sample of products that reported paying a bribe. The 
results are reported in Table 18, columns 1 through 4: a 1 percent percentage point 
increase in the tariff reduction is associated with a 3 percent increase in the proba-
bility of paying a coercive bribe, conditional on a bribe being paid.
I then extend the analysis to the entire sample through an ordered probit model, 
replacing the dependent variable with an indicator that takes the value −1 if a col-
lusive bribe was paid, 0 if no bribe was paid and 1 if a coercive bribe was paid. 
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 18 confirm that products that changed tariff level in 2008 
were more likely to pay coercive bribes following the tariff change.
While design constraints prevent me from conclusively identifying the reason 
behind this stickiness of bribe payments, a possible explanation is that shippers of 
former high tariff products had already signaled a high willingness to pay bribes 
(or a higher reference point of what was an “acceptable” bribe payment to clear 
a shipment) and would therefore be more likely to pay bribes for other reasons, 
18 While the potential for policy reform to trigger the displacement of corruption lies at the core of an extensive 
literature on law enforcement (Reppetto 1976; Chaiken, Lawless, and Stevenson 1974; McPheters, Mann, and 
Schlagenhauf 1984; Ayres and Levitt 1998; Levitt 1998; Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004), displacement effects of 
corruption in the context of trade policy and trade costs have remained largely unexplored with the exception of 
Yang (2008a, b). 
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 relative to shippers who were less accustomed to paying bribes altogether. Note that 
a straightforward revealed preference argument suggests that this shift is suboptimal 
for customs officials. First, the option of extracting bribes through coercive meth-
ods was present even before the tariff change, and yet it was overlooked in favor 
of taking bribes for tariff evasion for high tariff goods. Second, customs officials 
continued to extract bribes from products that remained in high tariff categories, 
primarily by selling tariff evasion. Finally, despite customs officials’ attempts to 
protect their bribe rents by resorting to alternative forms of bribe extraction, the total 
amount of bribes received by customs after the tariff change (in 2008, 2011, and 
2012) represented only 46 percent of their previous intake in 2007. This confirms 
that the tariff liberalization program, and consequently the reduced possibility of 
selling tariff evasion, was associated with a significant decline in customs officials’ 
overall bribe revenue.
Table 18—Shift from Collusive to Coercive Corruption
Probability of paying a coercive bribe Shift collusive to coercive
Linear probability model Ordered probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tariff change category × POST 0.442 0.318 0.834
(0.163) (0.149) (0.475)
Tariff change category 0.083 0.097 0.094
(0.137) (0.104) (0.471)
Tariff reduction × POST 0.029 0.020 0.018
(0.010) (0.012) (0.030)
Tariff reduction 0.014 0.007 0.041
(0.007) (0.006) (0.029)
POST 0.295 0.174 0.231 0.127 0.864 1.140
(0.089) (0.461) (0.111) (0.422) (1.801) (1.706)
Differentiated product 0.040 0.041 −0.021 0.031 0.350 0.114
(0.110) (0.124) (0.139) (0.12) (0.579) (0.554)
Perishable product −0.194 0.177 −0.236 0.091 0.239 0.046
(0.145) (0.192) (0.160) (0.187) (0.778) (0.776)
Firm size −0.066 −0.105 −0.059 −0.096 −0.986 −0.871
(0.064) (0.076) (0.058) (0.079) (0.382) (0.385)
log shipment value per ton 0.025 −0.017 0.0167 −0.019 0.0350743 0.018
(0.019) (0.030) (0.015) (0.029) (0.116) (0.110)
Controls
Day of the week arrival Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clearing agent Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-shipment inspection Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log baseline tariff Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates × post No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 228 220 228 220 1,084 1,084
F-statistic 30.69 27.98 18.54 15.88
Wald statistic 1,156 1,102.08
log pseudo-likelihood −591.316 −598.758
R2 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.29
Notes: Columns 1 through 4 represent a linear probability model, where the dependent variable equals 1 if a coer-
cive bribe was paid and 0 if a collusive bribe was paid instead. Columns 5 and 6 represent an ordered probit in which 
the dependent variable equals −1 if a collusive bribe was paid, 0 if no bribe was paid and 1 if a coercive bribe was 
paid. All columns represent the standard  difference-in-differences specification. In columns 1, 2, and 5 the treat-
ment variable equals 1 if the product falls under a tariff category that experienced a tariff reduction in 2008 and 0 
otherwise; in columns 3, 4, and 8 the treatment variable captures the percentage point tariff reduction experienced 
by each product. Robust standard errors are correlated at the level of the four-digit HS code.
Source: Audit study conducted by the author
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Taken together, these results suggest that displacement effects did not lead to 
a substantial increase in  firm-level trade costs. Overall, they dampened the total 
decline in corruption by less than 10 percent.19 Further note that these results are 
broadly consistent with the prediction in Yang (2008b): displacement effects from 
tariff evasion were small since alternative methods of bribe extraction had both 
higher fixed and variable costs.
G. Changes in Other Moments of the Distribution of Bribe Payments
A growing literature argues that it is not only the level of trade costs but the uncer-
tainty around them that is detrimental to business performance ( Hallward-Driemeier, 
Khun-Jush, and Pritchett 2012; Sequeira and Djankov 2014; Handley and Limao 
2015). I therefore test whether the change in tariffs affected trade costs by changing 
other moments of the bribe distribution, namely the variance of bribe payments.
Panel A in Table 19 shows, descriptively, that while bribe dispersion decreased 
for products experiencing a tariff reduction, it remained constant for products that 
continued to pay a bribe for tariff evasion. This suggests that the tariff change had 
a limited impact on patterns of bribe payments for tariff evasion of high tariff prod-
ucts. Bribe dispersion also decreased for products paying bribes to customs for rea-
sons other than tariff evasion, which is likely to be driven by the fact that following 
the tariff change, this category includes the smaller, coercive bribes paid by treat-
ment products. 
I then replace the dependent variable in equation (5) with the standard deviation 
of bribe payments, calculated at the  four-digit level of the HS classification, for all 
shipments sampled in the audit study. These findings are confirmed in the regression 
results presented in panel B, since products experiencing a tariff reduction were 
associated with smaller and more predictable bribes. These results suggest that it is 
unlikely that the small trade elasticities were driven by an increase in the uncertainty 
associated with  corruption-induced trade costs after the tariff change occurred.
V. Conclusion
This paper exploits a tariff liberalization scheme implemented in southern Africa 
to estimate trade elasticities. This scheme induced a  quasi-experimental variation 
in tariffs regulating trade between South Africa and Mozambique, with the most 
sizable reduction in tariffs occurring in 2007–2008. The main elasticity estimates 
are close to the lower range of elasticities estimated in the literature (0.1). I con-
firm these small elasticities at the  micro-level, by directly observing how incumbent 
firms located in the main trade corridor under analysis do not appear to significantly 
adjust their import behavior in response to the sizable tariff change.
I then examine the role of corruption in driving the estimated low elasticities, 
by combining secondary data on trade gaps with primary data on bribe payments 
at borders. The data show that corruption was rampant prior to the tariff change, 
which might have significantly reduced effective tariff costs for firms. Bribes were, 
19 For a more detailed and comprehensive discussion of all displacement effects evident in the data, see online 
Appendix Section IC. 
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however, small relative to the rent accrued from evading tariffs. The liberalization 
process could therefore have translated into a small reduction in actual trade costs, 
as the tariff removal combined with the reduction in bribes were too small to signifi-
cantly affect firms’ import decisions.
These findings suggest that trade elasticities associated with tariff liberalization 
schemes may be smaller than expected in contexts of pervasive corruption, which 
can then lead to inaccurate estimates of the gains associated with reductions in tar-
iffs. The removal of tariffs can, however, still effectively eliminate layers of corrupt 
transfers between firms and border officials and lead to more accurate reporting of 
trade flows by importers. This is particularly important given that exporters have 
less of an incentive to track exports as carefully as importers due to the lack of 
export duties.
Table 19—Tariff Liberalization and Bribe Dispersion
Panel A. Test of equality of means
Before
tariff change
After
tariff change Difference p-value
Standard deviation of bribes per ton 2,021 1,692 329 0.17
 (all products) (236) (50)
Standard deviation of bribes per ton 2,633 903 −1,531 0.00
 (treatment products) (448) (140)
Standard deviation of bribes per ton 1,652 1,059 593 0.35
 (bribes paid to customs for tariff evasion) (446) (449)
Standard deviation of bribes per ton 2,448 1,316 −1,133 0.06
 (bribes paid to customs by treatment products) (450) (392)
SD of bribe amount 
paid per ton,
OLS
Panel B. Dependent variable (1) (2)
Tariff change category × post −1,976 −3,742
(1,599) (1,835)
Tariff change category 1,999 3,567
(1,479) (1,754)
Post 320 −5,893
(315) (4,739)
Controls
Clearing agent fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Terminal Yes Yes
Day of the week arrival Yes Yes
Product from South Africa Yes Yes
log baseline tariff Yes Yes
Covariates × post Yes Yes
Observations 1,072 1,072
Mean of dependent variable 2.622 2.622
R2 0.49 0.53
Notes: Standard deviation of bribes per ton calculated at the level of the four-digit HS code. Differences (panel A) 
and robust standard errors (panel B) significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent.
Source: Audit study conducted by the author
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